Yaari's LifeCycle Model in the 21st Century: Consumption Under a Stochastic Force of Mortality (Joint work with H. Huang and T.S. Salisbury)

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8/Sep/2011 (Frankfurt)

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- The Yaari (1965) model was based on a deterministic force of mortality in which the entire survival curve is known at time zero.
- In this paper we extend the Yaari (1965) model with no annuities to a world with stochastic mortality rates.

"...As far as I am aware, no one has challenged the view that if people were capable of it, they ought to plan their consumption, saving and retirement according to the principles enunciated by Modigliani and Brumberg in 1950s..."

Professor Angus S. Deaton, Princeton University, 2005

Force of Mortality

 Let λ(t) denote the mortality rate of a cohort of a population. Let
 F_t = σ{λ(q) | q ≤ t} be the filtration determined by λ. Then
 individuals in the population have lifetimes of length ζ satisfying

$$P(\zeta > s \mid \zeta > t, \mathcal{F}_{\infty}) = e^{-\int_{t}^{s} \lambda(q) \, dq}.$$
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• Assume further that $\lambda(t)$ is a Markov process, and define the survival function $p(t, s, \lambda)$ by

$$p(t, s, \lambda) = E\left[e^{-\int_t^s \lambda(q) \, dq} \mid \lambda(t) = \lambda\right].$$
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(2)

• This gives the conditional probability of surviving from time *t* to time *s*, given knowledge of the mortality rate at time *t*. Therefore

$$P(\zeta > s \mid \zeta > t, \mathcal{F}_t) = E\left[e^{-\int_t^s \lambda(q) \, dq} \mid \mathcal{F}_t\right] = p(t, s, \lambda(t)). \quad (3)$$

If t = 0 then we write $p(s, \lambda)$ for $p(0, s, \lambda)$.

Gompertz Mortality

A very popular law of mortality is the Gompertz law of mortality.

$$\lambda(t) = rac{1}{b} \exp\left(rac{x+t-m}{b}
ight),$$



Notes:
$$x = 65$$
, $m = 89.3$, $b = 9.5$ and $p(0, 35, 0.0081) = 5\%$

Objective Function:

$$J = \max_{c} E\left[\int_{0}^{D} e^{-\rho t} u(c(t)) \mathbb{1}_{\{t \leq \zeta\}} dt\right],$$

where $\zeta \leq D$ is the remaining lifetime satisfying $\Pr[\zeta > t] = p(t, \lambda_0)$.

Image: Image:

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$$F_t(t) = v(t, F(t))F(t) + \pi_0 - c(t),$$

with F(0) = W > 0 and F(D) = 0.

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• The investment return v = v(t, F) is defined by:

$$v(t,F) = \begin{cases} r + \xi \lambda(t), & F \ge 0, \\ R + \lambda(t), & F < 0, \end{cases}$$

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Graphical View of the Solution



Four Different Wealth Trajectories

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When v(t) = r, and u(c) = c^(1-γ)/(1-γ) then by the Euler-Lagrange Theorem, the optimal F(t) must satisfy a second-order non-homogenous differential equation in regions where F(t) ≠ 0.

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- The PDE to solve is:

$$F_{tt}(t) - \left(\frac{r-\rho-\lambda(t)}{\gamma} + r\right)F_t(t) + r\left(\frac{r-\rho-\lambda(t)}{\gamma}\right)F(t)$$

= $-\left(\frac{r-\rho-\lambda(t)}{\gamma}\right)\pi_0.$

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= $-\left(\frac{r - \rho - \lambda(t)}{\gamma}\right) \pi_0.$

- In general the PDE can't be solved explicitly (unless λ is constant).
 We were able to solve for Gompertz mortality.
- Related literature: Leung (1990), Davies (1981), Lachance (2010).

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• Optimal trajectory of wealth is:

$$F(t) = \left(F(0) - c^*(0) \int_0^t e^{ks} (p(s, \lambda_0))^{1/\gamma} e^{-rs} ds\right) e^{rt}$$

= $(F(0) - c^*(0)a_x^t (r - k, m^*, b)) e^{rt}$

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Initial consumption rate is...

$$c^*(0) = rac{F(0)}{a_x^D(r-k,m^*,b)},$$

where $k = (r - \rho) / \gamma$ and $m^* = m + b \ln[\gamma]$.

Calibration: What Interest Rate Should we Use?



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Optimal Consumption Rate								
Coefficient	Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) $\gamma=4$							
Nest Egg of	\$100 Invest	ed at Follov	ving REAL	Rates				
	$\ r = 0.5\% \ r = 1.5\% \ r = 2.5\% \ r = 3.5\%$							
Age 65								
5 Years Later								
10 Years Later								
20 Years Later								
30 Years Later								

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Nest Egg of	Nest Egg of \$100 Invested at Following REAL Rates							
	r = 0.5% r = 1.5% r = 2.5% r = 3.5%							
Age 65	Age 65 \$3.330 \$3.941 \$4.605 \$5.318							
5 Years Later	\$3.286	\$3.888	\$4.544	\$5.247				
10 Years Later	10 Years Later \$3.212 \$3.801 \$4.442 \$5.130							
20 Years Later \$2.898 \$3.429 \$4.007 \$4.627								
30 Years Later	\$2.156	\$2.552	\$2.982	\$3.444				

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Optimal Initial Withdrawal Rate (IWR) from \$100								
As	a Functio	on of Pens	sion Incon	ne π_0				
Depending of	on the Co	efficient o	of Relative	Risk Aversion				
	$\gamma = 1 \mid \gamma = 2 \mid \gamma = 4 \mid \gamma = 8$							
No Pension	o Pension 6.330% 5.301% 4.605% 4.121%							
$\pi_0 = \$1$								
$\pi_0=$ \$2	$\pi_0 = \$2$							
$\pi_0 = \$5$								
Note: Gompertz Mortality ($m=89.3, b=9.5$) and $r=2.5\%$								

3. 3

Optimal Initial Withdrawal Rate (IWR) from \$100								
As	a Functio	on of Pens	sion Incon	ne π_0				
Depending of	on the Co	efficient o	of Relative	Risk Aversion				
	$\gamma = 1 \gamma = 2 \gamma = 4 \gamma = 8$							
No Pension	No Pension 6.330% 5.301% 4.605% 4.121%							
$\pi_0 = \$1$	6.798%	5.653%	4.873%	4.324%				
$\pi_0=$ \$2	$\pi_0 = \$2$ 7.162% 5.924% 5.078% 4.480%							
$\pi_0 = \$5$ 8.015% 6.553% 5.551% 4.839%								
Note: Gompe	Note: Gompertz Mortality ($m = 89.3$, $b = 9.5$) and $r = 2.5\%$							

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Retire with a \$100 Nest Egg and a \$5 per year pension...



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8/Sep/2011 (Frankfurt)

Ehe New Hork Eimes SundayBusiness

Commercial Real Estate, Pages 22-25

Sunday, September 25, 2005

Section 3

New Advice to Retirees: Spend More at First, Cut Back Later

Two planners

challenge the

approach for managing that

traditional

nest egg.

By ILANA POLYAK

W much can you take out of your retirement new egg each year without numing out of money?

Not much, according to the standard, conservative advice of stancy function planeters. They obtain say that people who reture at the age of 61 can solely remove only about 4 percent of their portfolios early year, along with diputations for inframos. On this basis, the anxial withdrawal trium a portfolio worth El million would be just \$40.00.

But some experts have been making waves by sugproting that it may make more sense to withdraw bigger amounts in the early years of retirement.

By Detricke, a finiterial planter in Eas Claure, Wit, for example, seys retrieves precisive parentally spend hous an Oney app, we that it is reasonable for them to spend more when they are in neutromostic weatly stages. So, henteries i conditiones, which which on that house the Butor 2005, were planted as four to the Albount the Bucale Planning, (were Spentrum Journal articles/2005 Journes/2006/2017.

Spending in practically every category, from housing to clothing to ensertuationent, decloses with age, the data showed. The only category as which spending rises with age is health care, for said

"It's almost a tag of war between inflation pushing corrs up and human stature pulling them back down," Mr. Bernicke said

Projute over 19 speet 25 percent text, on average, than these in the 50-to-14 age group, And the grouper the age difference, the grounder the difference is speeding: These over 15 speet 40 percent less than these aged 40 is a sufi it security is a strain these same 41 to 14. "More seOvergr and Karby Wagare, but 18 and cleans of W. Bortskie Las Calzare, respect to spead two as the yran's advance, Mr. Magare said. Be has decided to take entry restanting tomography in hate 2005, whose he well as a structure of the same same structure and the same in months parts of the same same same same same in months parts of Wilsonson, The couple and expect the interpreters in Wilsonson and Conserver.

"Am 1 group to end up topoiding a little bit more matery up fram? Yes," Mr. Magnew and, but the period of higher expenditures should be relatively brief. In "wen't be more than the first two or

Then he expects to reduce spendag gradually in things like travel and entertainment - making up for increases in braith care. Mr Magare and

The traditional advice that calls for an initial withdrawal if a percent in haund on terroral animaphane. To compensate for inflation, the withdrawal rate would increase b periode every years. Sensences with a 10 million next eng could take out 564,000 the first part and 8-2,201 die next year, for example

And the new egg would generally be an verticed at least 50 percent in stocks -- as a further bedge against inflation -- with the remainder in fund-ancient investments and cash.

The approach is based on risk-assessment studies song all kinds of hypothetical examples of market returns. The withdrawal rates are attended to leave very limit charce of running out of manry.

"Our whole previous is that it this \$40,000 is to have the state purchasing power for the rest of your life, we have to inflate it," said Christine Fahlund, senior from rind inflater with Y. Know Power Lanceton do To Mr. Bernicka, a rought who special shall be in beautory trant of revenuence may an arc incode to special as much when they are in these Wrs. Propile who are 15 and sintesigned are average of BV is a previous on apparent and intertions or example, while these who are 61 to 15 apparent waves in much, based on the museumer survey be used. Theore 15 and up topend an average of \$600 a years for emminances, currenges of while 3, previous for the taxes of the 15 and the topend with \$43, \$13, \$10 the theore 61 to 7.

According to his calculations, a couple in the first year of retrieveness at age 50, with expenditures of \$10.000 mucht be able to asher workfrow that much

From a pertflute worth El millium - a 4 percett initial withdrawal rate. They would not rust out of money as latig as they reduced their opening laiser on according to the pattern shown in the survey, he used.

"In courte it depends on the root of vicels and bonds in stansaum's pertulae," Mr. Bernicke said, "But a 6 percent withdrawal rate becomes very realists,"

cause of many factors, including a retares's spending level and the size of the next egg.

Others advocate lossening the purse scrutage in retrement, but for other reasons, in the October 2004 issue of The Journal of Frinancial Planting, Jonathan Guyton, a

planear at Chartervine Veah Advises in Minneyolia, advant a portent, drawing his conclusions from a high as advant a percent, drawing his conclusions from a solid of more methants from 100 adda. Mc. Captas adda advanta advanta advanta advanta s percentres, here markets with very high addatase, anda here response at 52 percent and windoward area ever 49 percent with a percention draw as B percent stocks. A percentilis with a percention draw as B percent stocks. Guyton said, "Br's usually the last E10,000 that puts the quality in 'quality of life."

In order too take out source that 6 percent that form year, Mr. Gapricis said, provinces needs in thinking a fore rights. To gamerale account, they must always self, wosing stocks betfore bench or longe tracks. They cannot define the are a percent a year to that withdrawal reven include more than a percent a year to that withdrawal reven include more thank to be a store of a percent a year of the related more than a the percent a year of the store that to be more than a store of the store of the store of the store of the more than the store of the store of

Mr. Guytane's research can be loand at some fpanet org/mormal/arotaties/2004, Isman//fp1004-art6.cfm.

D be survey, Mr. Rereschar's and Mr. Guyton's ideas have been met with sheptician by many planners the wavey that medical costs may rise to fair that there will survey a sub-construction flanners.

The own c of prescription drugs, for example, has been range mouse than three times an fast as inflation according to defate from AARP, a lobbying regaritation for adder Americans. Naming home costs, meanwhile have been ranging 6 percent a year, according to survey to theremulation. I.f. as an exampler in compare

To hedge a against these expenses, Mr hermicke ad vises retirees to to buy insurance pulsies, but many plan nexts are peoplede need to any intere and withdraw less.

"I prote r a more cancervative emission of dotectuans, "stated liophatice Rescaled efficiences Would Advances you Licks: Agences, "I card go back and say they. The abated have preserve, if summore describtions memory the lastant have preserve, if summore describtions memory the lastant have preserve, if summore describtions memory the lastant have preserve at they while see in treasument, "Tanking having and their none on your hands," who sudding the summore at they while see in treasument, "Tanking a treasily speed moter."

And Mr. R. Bernicke, who is 20 years aid, said he saving harinesizely for his own retirement. He advises off

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Wealth Trajectory



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How Does Pensionization Impact Consumption?						
Percent	Risk Ave	ersion $\gamma=4$	Risk Aversion $\gamma =$			
Pensionized	Age 65	Age 80	Age 65	Age 80		
0%						
20%						
40%						
60%						
100%						

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How Does Pensionization Impact Consumption?							
Percent	Risk Ave	ersion $\gamma=4$	Risk Aversion $\gamma = 1$				
Pensionized	Age 65	Age 80	Age 65	Age 80			
0%	\$4.605	\$4.007	\$4.121	\$3.844			
20%	\$5.263	\$4.580	\$4.801	\$4.478			
40%	\$5.795	\$5.042	\$5.385	\$5.024			
60%	\$6.227	\$5.419	\$5.937	\$5.538			
100%	\$6.330	\$6.330	\$6.330	\$6.330			

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- What happens when we allow for a stochastic mortality rate $\lambda(t)$?
- In particular, what if

$$d\lambda(t) = \mu(t)\lambda(t)dt + \sigma\lambda(t)dB(t)$$

• How does optimal consumption behavior change and what is the impact of "longevity risk aversion" on the optimal plan?

Deterministic force of Mortality (DfM) World

$$_{10}p_{90} = \frac{_{35}p_{65}}{_{25}p_{65}}$$

Conditional Survival Probability:							
	x = 65	x = 75	x = 85	x = 90	x = 95	x = 100	
To 65	1.000						
To 75	0.8659	1.000					
To 85	0.5733	0.6620	1.000				
To 90	0.3696	0.4268	0.6447	1.000			
To 95	0.1758	0.2031	0.3067	0.4757	1.000		
To 100	0.0500	0.0577	0.0872	0.1353	0.2844	1.000	
λ_x	0.0081	0.0232	0.0667	0.1129	0.1911	0.3234	

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Stochastic force of Mortality (SfM) World

Conditional Survival Probability:						
	x = 65	x = 75	x = 85	x = 90	x = 95	x = 100
To 65	1.000					
To 75	0.8659	1.000				
To 85	0.5733	?	1.000			
To 90	0.3696	?	?	1.000		
To 95	0.1758	?	?	?	1.000	
To 100	0.0500	?	?	?	?	1.000
λ_x	0.0081	?	?	?	?	?

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- We condition on wealth F(t) and the mortality rate $\lambda(t)$.
- The wealth process (budget constraint) still satisfies dF(t) = (rF(t) c(t))dt.

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is a martingale and...

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• It can be written as:

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• By Ito's lemma, we have the following HJB equation for the value function:

$$\sup_{c} \{u(c) - cJ_F\} + J_t - (r + \lambda)J + rFJ_F + \mu(t)\lambda J_\lambda + \frac{\sigma^2\lambda^2}{2}J_{\lambda\lambda} = 0$$

Solution under SfM: Part #2

• Solve the HJB equation under CRRA utility as follows:

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- Let

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Solution under SfM: Part #2

- Solve the HJB equation under CRRA utility as follows:
 - $u(c) = rac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}, \quad J = rac{F^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} a(t,\lambda)$
- Apply the 1st order condition $c^* = J_F^{-rac{1}{\gamma}}$. We obtain

$$c^* = Fa^{-\frac{1}{\gamma}}$$

and get the following equation for $a(t, \lambda)$:

$$m{a}_t - (r\gamma + \lambda)m{a} + \gammam{a}^{1-rac{1}{\gamma}} + \mu(t)\lambdam{a}_\lambda + rac{\sigma^2\lambda^2}{2}m{a}_{\lambda\lambda} = 0$$

with boundary condition $a(T, \lambda) = 0$.

Let

Main Question: How does the volatility of mortality (σ), impact the optimal initial withdrawal rate? The drift $\mu(t)$ of the mortality rate process is calibrated to fit a Gompertz survival curve (m = 89.3, b = 9.5), such that p(35, 0.0081) = 5%

Optimal Initial Withdrawal Rate (IWR)						
Volatility	$\gamma = 0.5$	$\gamma = 1.0$	$\gamma = 1.5$	$\gamma = 3$	$\gamma = 5$	$\gamma = 10$
$\sigma = 0$						
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Notes: Retirement age 65, interest rate $r = 2\%$, mortality $\lambda_0 = 0.0081$						

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Volatility	$\gamma = 0.5$	$\gamma = 1.0$	$\gamma = 1.5$	$\gamma = 3$	$\gamma = 5$	$\gamma = 10$	
$\sigma = 0$	7.59%	6.12%	5.58%	5.02%	4.78%	4.61%	
$\sigma = 15\%$	7.52%	6.12%	5.60%	5.04%	4.80%	4.62%	
$\sigma = 25\%$ 7.44% 6.12% 5.62% 5.06% 4.82% 4.63%							
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- Denote by $c^{\text{SfM}}(t, \lambda, F)$ the optimal consumption at time t, given $\lambda(t) = \lambda$ and F(t) = F, under a stochastic force of mortality (SfM) model. Denote by $c^{\text{DfM}}(t, F)$ the optimal consumption at time t, when F(t) = F, under a deterministic force of mortality (DfM) model.

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- **THEOREM**: Assume that the survival functions for the two models agree: $p^{\text{SfM}}(t, \lambda_0) = p^{\text{DfM}}(t, \lambda_0)$ for every $t \ge 0$, and that utility is CRRA(γ). There are three regimes: (a) $\gamma > 1 \Longrightarrow c^{\text{SfM}}(0, \lambda_0, F) \ge c^{\text{DfM}}(0, F)$. (b) $\gamma = 1 \Longrightarrow c^{\text{SfM}}(0, \lambda_0, F) = c^{\text{DfM}}(0, F)$. (c) $0 < \gamma < 1 \Longrightarrow c^{\text{SfM}}(0, \lambda_0, F) \le c^{\text{DfM}}(0, F)$.

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- Proof in the paper...

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- Future research will examine the impact of annuities in such a model.