



# *How Has the Financial Crisis Affected the Incomes of Households Entering and in Retirement?*

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
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# The facts

- Stock prices fell by 57 percent between October 2007 and March 2009.
- In August 2011, they are still 24 percent below October 2007 levels.
- But this understates the loss relative to a counterfactual of expected long-run returns.

# Stock returns relative to expectations


S&P 500 Index 2000-2011



Source: Standard & Poor's. 2000-2011. "S&P 500 Index."

# Nominal and real interest rates on short-term deposits have fallen to record lows.

Real and Nominal Short-term Interest Rates 1960-2011



Source: One Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis. Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

# Three ways of analyzing the effects of the financial crisis

- Reduction in wealth.
- Reduction in current income.
- Reduction in sustainable consumption.

# Calculations based on reductions in wealth and income can mislead.

- Reduction in wealth disregards any changes in the income producing potential of that wealth.
- What matters for a household is not current income, but current and prospective total return.

# Reductions in wealth

- These were quite modest for most households, because most households hold large proportions of their wealth in short-term deposits. The wealthy lost most in both dollar and percentage terms because their portfolios were more heavily weighted toward stocks.

# Reductions in wealth (cont'd)

October 2007 Portfolio Balances and Allocations, Households Ages 60-69

Wealth quintile	1	2	3	4	5
	Financial Assets (\$)				
Stocks	0	512	14,505	93,407	647,185
Bonds	0	151	4,010	20,242	118,404
Cash	31	2,255	15,361	48,203	137,624
Total	31	2,918	33,876	161,852	903,213
	Asset Allocation (%)				
Stocks	0	18	43	58	72
Bonds	0	5	12	13	13
Cash	100	77	45	30	15
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Percentage loss of wealth to June 2011	0	2	5	7	9

Source: Authors' calculations based on *Health and Retirement Study* data.



# Reductions in income

- Dividends on stocks declined only 10.6 percent, but interest rates on short-term deposits collapsed to zero.
- The wealthy experienced smaller percentage declines in investment income.
- But the declines experienced by the less wealthy were small, both in dollar terms, and as a percentage of total income.

# Reductions in income (cont'd)

## Reductions in Investment Income 2007-2011, Households Ages 60-69

Wealth quintile	1	2	3	4	5
Dollars	3	89	634	2,099	6,864
As percent of 2007 investment income	95	85	59	43	31
As percent of 2007 total income	0	1	7	9	15
Investment income as a percent of total income	0%	1%	12%	20%	49%

Source: Authors' calculations based on *Health and Retirement Study* data.

# Reductions in sustainable consumption

Optimal strategy involves:

- focusing on total return;
- considering the distribution of prospective returns;
- decumulating wealth, trading off risk of outliving that wealth against the cost of unnecessarily restricting current consumption.

# Optimal strategy (cont'd)

- We calculate an optimal decumulation and asset allocation strategy for a household age 65 in October 2007, based on October 2007 beliefs regarding investment returns.
- We assume CRRA utility.

$$C_{t,m} = \frac{(C_{t,m} + \lambda C_{t,f})^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma}$$

- This strategy expresses consumption as an age-varying percentage of current wealth.

# Optimal strategy (cont'd)

- We project consumption, assuming expected returns.
- We calculate actual consumption 2007-2010, given realized returns.
- In 2011, the household reassesses prospective investment returns, and recalculates its strategy.

# What were reasonable beliefs in 2007?

PE ratio was 20 – an earnings yield of 5 percent.

Reasonable beliefs might have been that:

- real stock returns were normally distributed with a mean of 5 percent and standard deviation of 18.0;
- real bond returns had a mean of 3 percent and standard deviation of 5.5 percent;
- returns on short-term deposits would remain at 2007 levels.

# What were reasonable beliefs in 2007? (cont'd)

- Corporate profits have rebounded.
- PE ratio is about 13, implying an earnings yield of 6.5 percent.
- Current prices of Treasury securities imply that short-term rates will remain below 1 percent until 2014, but will surpass 4 percent by the end of 2017. This implies a real return of about 2 percent.


# But what if the economy doesn't recover as expected?

- Short-term interest rates might remain low for an extended period.
- But prospective stock returns of as low as 5 percent would require a substantial and prolonged decline in GDP and/or corporate profit share of GDP.



# Optimal consumption from financial assets pre-and post-crisis

Optimal Consumption from Investments, Households Age 65 in 2007



Source: Authors' calculations.

# Optimal total consumption pre-and post-crisis

Percentage Reductions in Optimal Consumption 2007-2011

Wealth quintile	1	2	3	4	5
	Percentage reduction in optimal consumption from financial assets				
Market outlook	6	5	9	13	15
Pessimistic outlook	9	7	12	16	18
	Percentage reduction in total consumption				
Market outlook	0	0	1	3	7
Pessimistic outlook	0	0	1	3	9

Source: Authors' calculations.

# Conclusions

- The bottom 40 percent had nothing and lost nothing.
- Most households hold large proportions of their financial assets in short-term deposits. This protected them against reductions in stock prices, but resulted in substantial declines in investment income.
- The wealthy hold larger proportions of their wealth in stocks and depend more on financial assets to fund post-retirement consumption. They were hit hardest by the crisis.
- The reductions in wealth and current income are partially offset by increases in prospective returns.

# Lessons for the future

- Households can have a guaranteed return of capital, or a guaranteed return on capital, but not both. The latter is arguably more valuable.
- If the optimal stock-bond portfolio allocation at age 64 is 50:50, it is unlikely to be optimal to invest everything in a fixed annuity at age 65. Why is the market for variable immediate annuities so small?
- Stock returns are not normally distributed. Why do models of optimal wealth decumulation (mine included!) continue to assume normality?