

# Housing, Long-Term Care Insurance, and Annuities with Recursive Utility

Mengyi Xu, Jennifer Alonso-García, Adam Shao, and Michael Sherris

School of Risk and Actuarial Studies and ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR), UNSW Australia, Sydney, Australia

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- 1 Introduction
- 2 Lifecycle model in retirement
- 3 Results
- 4 Conclusions

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# Research Background

- Individuals face greater challenges in financing their retirement
  - living longer → harder to allocate resources over time to avoid ruin
  - likely to spend more time in disability → expensive healthcare cost
- Growing interest in retirement products
  - life annuities → hedge longevity risk
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- Only a handful of papers consider home equity among the studies looking at optimal consumption and portfolio choice during retirement
- The role of housing wealth among the elderly can hardly be overlooked

# Research Motivation

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- A large fraction of household portfolios held in the form of housing
  - median ratio of home equity to all assets 56% among 62+ (Davidoff, 2009)
- Generally not reduced among people who continue to own (Venti and Wise, 1990, 1991, 2004)  
→ left to heirs
- Selling often associated with losing spouse or entering into a nursing home (Walker, 2004; Venti and Wise, 2004)  
→ can insure against uncertain healthcare cost



# Research Overview

Study the impact of housing wealth on demand for life annuities and LTCI

- Multi-period lifecycle model for a single retired homeowner
- Choose between life annuities and LTCI at the point of retirement
- Risks: lifespan, health expenditure, house price

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Study the impact of  $\gamma$  and  $\psi$  on the demand

- $\gamma$ : risk aversion;  $\psi$ : elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS)
- Epstein-Zin-Weil-type utility (Epstein and Zin, 1989, 1991; Weil, 1989)
  - generalise the power utility model
  - separately identify risk aversion and EIS

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


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    - severe disability is usually chronic in nature that substantially reduces the possibility of recovery (Ferri and Olivieri, 2000; Olivieri and Pitacco, 2001)
- allow transition from mildly disabled to healthy state
- do not allow for recoveries from severely disabled state

## Health transitions (Cont')



$$\begin{array}{ccc} \sigma_{jk} & \xrightarrow{\text{matrix exponential}} & \pi(s_{t+1} = k | s_t = j) \\ \text{transition intensity} & & \text{transition probability} \end{array}$$

Model health expenditure that is not covered by the government

- A deterministic process given the health state (Ameriks et al., 2011)
- Relative price of healthcare increases at a rate of  $q$  per annum



# Housing and financial assets

- Housing asset
  - majority of retired homeowners have paid off their mortgages
    - assume the individual lives in a mortgage-free home at retirement
  
- Financial assets
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- gross rate of return  $R_{H,t+1}$  from time  $t$  to time  $t + 1$ 
  - $\ln(R_{H,t+1}) \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_H, \sigma_H^2)$

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- life annuities
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  - level payment for the remaining lifetime
- long-term care insurance (LTCI)
  - choose the percentage coverage
  - cover healthcare cost for severely disabled state

Do not explicitly model the public offering of similar products

Epstein-Zin-Weil-type preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989, 1991; Weil, 1989)

- Risk aversion ( $\gamma$ )
- Elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ( $\psi$ )
- Reduces to the power utility model when  $\gamma = 1/\psi$

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# Base case analysis

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

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- Annuity costs \$14.89 per \$1 annual income

# Simulated health states



- ~ 50% chance of living beyond age 85
- chance of becoming severely disabled increases significantly after age 85

# Optimal product choices at retirement

Wealth (\$000)		Single product			Both products		
		Annuity only		LTCI only	Annuity		LTCI
Liquid	House	% Liquid	% Total		% Liquid	% Total	
500	0	0.30	0.30	0.93	0.71	0.71	0.92
220	280	0.94	0.41	0.89	0.65	0.29	0.81

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- Annuity only: illiquid housing wealth significantly enhances demand for annuities
  - presence of home equity lowers the barrier to annuitisation
- LTCI: illiquid housing wealth reduces demand for LTCI
  - home equity serves as an insurance against healthcare costs

## Optimal product choices at retirement (Cont')

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- LTCI available: illiquid housing wealth can reduce demand for annuities
  - depends on the amount of liquid wealth (found in the sensitivity analysis)

# Impact of preference parameters

	Annuity	LTCI
Coef. of relative risk aversion		
$\gamma = 2$	↑	↓
$\gamma = 10$	↓	↑
Elasticity of intertemporal subs.		
$\psi = 0.2$	↑	↓
$\psi = 0.7$	↓	↑

## Demand for annuities and LTCI

- $\gamma \uparrow \rightarrow$  more risk averse  
 $\rightarrow$  LTCI  $\uparrow$  annuity  $\downarrow$

↑: increase compared to the base case

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## Demand for annuities and LTCI

- $\gamma \uparrow \rightarrow$  more risk averse  
 $\rightarrow$  LTCI  $\uparrow$  annuity  $\downarrow$
- $\psi \downarrow \rightarrow$  more concerned about intertemporal consumption smoothing & less concerned about insuring against health risk  
 $\rightarrow$  LTCI  $\downarrow$  annuity  $\uparrow$

# Impact of preference parameters (Cont')

- Power utility model:  $\gamma \times \psi \equiv 1$ 
  - $\gamma \uparrow \rightarrow \psi \equiv 1/\gamma \downarrow$
  - inadequate in determining the demand when  $\gamma \neq 1/\psi$



# Impact of preference parameters (Cont')

- Power utility model:  $\gamma \times \psi \equiv 1$ 
  - $\gamma \uparrow \rightarrow \psi \equiv 1/\gamma \downarrow$
  - inadequate in determining the demand when  $\gamma \neq 1/\psi$

In reality,

- Individuals have relative risk aversion greater than the reciprocal of the EIS (Brown and Kim, 2013)
- Individuals have heterogeneous preference parameters
  - risk tolerance and the EIS are essentially uncorrelated across individuals (Barsky et al., 1997)
  - the rich have larger EIS than the poor (Ogaki and Atkeson, 1997)

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- Presence of home equity
  - typically increases the optimal annuitisation rate (when annuities alone are available)
  - can enhance demand for annuities if there are sufficient liquid assets (when LTCI is also available)
- Importance of separating risk aversion and EIS
  - a higher  $\gamma$  and a lower  $\psi$  have opposite effects on the demand for annuities and LTCI
  - the power utility model is unable to disentangle the impact of these two factors

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